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THE SWISS CITY CANTON: A POLITICAL INVENTION*
All major Swiss cities are located north of the Alps. Their development can
be understood best as part of the development of the North European cities
— those of Germany, Flanders and France — and as part of the communal
movement as it developed in those areas. Yet the cities that eventually be-
came Swiss are those that accepted more of the characteristic institutions of
Italian city-states than did the rest, and it is this acceptance of certain Italian
practices — particularly the creation of a rural territory and thus eventually
of a territorial city-state — that made those cities into city Cantons, able to
take part in the formation of Switzerland.
This paper will first of all describe the main alternative developments of
the economic and political interests of cities, and the most relevant features
of the cities of Northern Europe. It will then show in what respects the
developing Swiss city Cantons resembled either the North European or the
Italian models, and to what extent their development was characterized by
original Swiss political inventions.
SOME POSSIBLE CONFIGURATIONS OF THE INTERESTS OF CITIES
In the short run, practical politicians as well as students of politics tend to
consider political and economic interests as given. Politics then appears as
the more or less effective expression or pursuit of these interests that have
already been determined. A more long-range analysis, however, must consider
the alternative ways in which interests may be not only perceived and pursued,
but also weakened or strengthened, aggregated and developed in alternative
patterns by political action. If interests go far in making politics, political
decisions, in turn, go far to change and remake interests and interest con-
figurations. As in the proverbial case of the chicken and the egg, the processes
of evolution and selection may operate at either or both stages of the cycle.
The basic interests of medieval cities, and of the elites ruling them, may be
* Adapted from a chapter of a forthcoming book, United for Diversity: The Political
Integration of the Swiss People, by Karl W. Deutsch and Hermann Weilenmann, based
on research supported by the Carnegie Corporation.
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394 DEUTSCH AND WEILENMANN
grouped under sixteen headings, as shown schematically in the Table that
follows. The first eight of these are economic, in four groupings, relating to
trade, craft, creditor and employer interests, respectively. The remaining eight
interests are social and political. These may be put under three groups, per-
taining to status, political autonomy, and social and political integration.
TABLE
Some Major Interests and Interest Configurations
in 14th-16th Century Europe
Interests Groups Affected *
Alliance Type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Urban Urban Peas- Rural
Elites Poor ants Nobles Churches Princes
I. Economic
A. Trade
1. Open trade routes + + + — + +
2. Monopolistic advantages + + — — — +
B. Crafts
3. Cheap food imports + + — — + +
4. Monopolistic advantages + + — — — +
against peasants
C. Credit
5. Privileged lending to + + — — — +
nobles and/or peasants
6. Enforcement of collections -f — — — — +
D. Employer
7. Cheap non-competitive labor + — — + + +
8. Subordination of urban poor + — + + + +
II. Social & Political
E. Status
9. Equal status vs. nobles + + + — — —
10. Superior status vs. peasants + + — + + +
11. Superior status vs. urban poor + — + + + +
F. Political Autonomy
12. Internal + + + — — —
13. External + + + — — —
G. Integration (including poor)
14. Civic Solidarity -f + — — — —
15. Civic Participation + + — — — —
16. Integration with countryside -f- + + — — —
Total number of favorable interests 16 12 7 4 6 10
with urban elites
* + favorably, — unfavorably.
Note: This tabulation is grossly simplified. Most obviously it disregards the relative
weight of the interests listed. In some cities, the four interests shared by the urban rich
with the rural nobles might outweigh the twelve interests — less salient to them —
which they might share with the urban poor. It has also to be remembered that political
victories or representation of artisan crafts, though reducing the power of the merchant
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The trade interests of a city involve the keeping open of trade routes and
trade opportunities, and in the second place, the acquisition of monopolistic
advantages in both buying and selling, resulting in favorable terms of trade
vis-a-vis the city's customers and sources of supply. The craft interests were
somewhat similar: they consisted in winning and maintaining monopolistic
advantages in regard to all craft products and services, as against all possible
competitors and customers; in securing a cheap and dependable food supply;
and thus in maintaining highly favorable terms of trade against the country-
side — both peasants and nobles — who would have to exchange relatively
cheap food for relatively expensive products of the urban craft monopolies.
Another urban economic interest was the creditor interest. This involved
first of all the securing of the creditor role for the town burghers, and the
elimination or restriction of other sources of credit, such as the Jews, or else
their eventual incorporation into the body of citizens, as might happen in the
case of the Lombards and Cahorsins. Beyond this, the urban creditor interest
then called for protected — i.e., monopolistic — opportunities to lend money
at interest to nobles, and possibly also directly to peasants; and it called
particularly for dependable facilities for enforcing payments of these debts,
including the seizure of pawns, the foreclosing of property, and the acquisition
of feudal or peasant land by urban creditors.
Finally, there developed in the economically more advanced cities an em-
ployer interest. This interest on the part of the wealthier citizens and the
urban elites grew up with the rise of wage labor and other economic practices
foreshadowing the capitalism of later centuries. It included an interest in
cheap sources of labor, and in the firm economic, social and political sub-
ordination of the urban poor.
Related to these various potential economic interests, but distinct from
them, were the status interests of the urban populations, and particularly of
the urban elites. On the one hand, the burghers wanted equality of status —•
that is, of rights, of respect, attention, prestige, and access to offices and
office-holders — vis-a-vis the aristocracy, outside the town or within it. On
the other hand, the same burghers might — and not rarely did — want
superior social status vis-a-vis the peasantry, and they also might want to be
able to look down upon the urban poor and upon the more recent immigrants
into the city — thus claiming at the same time equality against the nobles and
oligarchy against the countryside and against many of their fellow townsmen.
Any and all of these diverse interests required for their pursuit political
opportunities and political institutions, and thus gave rise to political interests
entrepreneurs who had at first ruled industrial cities, could not eliminate their influence
where export industry was concerned nor prevent its reliance in some places on rural
labor. See the chapters by A. B. Hibbert and by Sylvia L. Thrupp on "The Economic
Policies of Towns" and "The Gilds" in The Cambridge Economic History of Europe,
vol. Ill (Cambridge University Press, 1963).
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of the cities and their leaders. First among these was the interest in internal
self-government for the city — in the fullest possible autonomy in regard to
judicial, fiscal and internal political matters. Hardly second to this was the
interest of most cities in being subject to little or no external taxation, in
being able to buy external military or political protection cheaply, or in
providing it for themselves at tolerable cost, in controlling their own external
relations, and thus in winning and holding as much as possible of the sub-
stance and form of political sovereignty.
Last but not least in this list of potential urban interests was the interest of
each city in some substantial degree of social and political integration. Where
it existed, such integration would manifest itself in civic solidarity, in the
readiness of all townsfolk to serve their city, to support it by taxes or labor,
and to take active part in its defense against external enemies. Without such
solidarity and broad civic military participation, even large cities were helpless
before outside powers, or they became dependent upon mercenaries and their
captains. The other side of this same coin of civic solidarity was civic, social
and political participation, the leadership by broad and relatively open elites,
with significant opportunities for social and economic rise of gifted and
energetic persons from all strata. Together, these factors went far to determine
the internal stability of cities and their governments, as well as their strength
and their chances of preserving their independence against outside powers.
THE CHOICE OF INTERESTS AND POLICIES
In the preceding paragraphs we have listed sixteen interrelated but distinct
potential economic, social and political interests of cities. In most cities whose
political history is relevant for our discussion, most of these potential interests
became actual, at least at some time and to some degree.
To pursue all these interests at once would have been quite impossible. In
order to assert some of these interests against the rural nobles, the leaders of
a city might need the backing of their own poorer townsfellows, or the backing
of a powerful abbot, or bishop, or territorial prince, — or even an alliance
with the peasantry. In order to exploit the countryside, conversely, a city had
to have the backing of a prince, or at least the support of a large part of its
own people. And in order to maintain or even increase the subordination of
the poorer — and much larger — part of the city's own population, notably
the wage earners such as the notoriously unruly journeymen, the elite mem-
bers and would-be oligarchs of a city had to secure the tolerance for support
of outside nobles, as well as often also of churchmen and of the overlord of
the city, where there still was one, or of the territorial prince, for the preser-
vation of their unpopular regime within the city.
In each case, choices had to be made. The choice of the interest to be put
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foremost at each stage might seem obvious and "naturally" given from the
conditions then prevailing in the city. Once taken, however, the choice of
most salient interests dictated to a significant degree the choice of policies,
of allies, and of institutions. No less sharply it determined what policies and
alliances had to be foregone. The results of all these choices, in their interplay
with external events, in turn then strengthened or weakened or otherwise
changed the interests and interest configurations from which the original
policies had started; and the changed interests in turn once again pushed the
policies and alliances of each city in some direction in which they once more
would modify the city's interests.
The perception, pursuit and redefinition of the social, economic and politi-
cal interests of a medieval city — much like all interest-based policies to this
day — thus formed part of a repetitive feedback cycle. This feedback cycle
might be negative in nature, that is, later developments might often counteract
the earlier choices of leading interests and policies and thus, in the long run,
keep the city on some middle course, with no one interest configuration
becoming solidly dominant. Or the feedback cycle of interests and policies
might be amplifying, that is, self-reinforcing, so that later policies would ever
further strengthen the interests from which they had arisen, until a very
sharply-defined and perhaps quite one-sided interest configuration would
become dominant for a long time. By choosing its favored interests and
policies, a city thus would choose, in part, its nature. The interests favored,
and the long-term strategies chosen by either commission or omission, would
often determine the type of cities, and the type that emerged as predominant
would then determine the character of urban politics for a major period and
region.
FROM COMPETITION TO TYRANNY: THE POLITICAL STRATEGY
OF THE ITALIAN CITY-STATES
In great Italian cities such as Milan and Florence, policies were chosen that
tended for a long time to promote all of the sixteen interests listed above,
except the last three, relating to social integration — the interests of civic
solidarity and voluntary popular political participation, both within the city
and in relation to the countryside under its rule.
In the language of our Table, the governments of these great Italian com-
munes first during the 11th and 12th centuries had followed mixed alliance
policies of types 2, 3 and 5, that is, of alliances with the urban poor, the
peasants and the Church. A modern historian comments on the mildness of
social distinction and the ease of rise into the upper classes in the Italian
communes of that time; and the victory of the Lombard communes over
Emperor Barbarossa at Legnano in 1176 furnished impressive evidence of
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their civic solidarity.1 Attempts in the early 13th century to subject church
property to communal taxation, as in Cremona, Piacenza, Bergamo and
Treviso, proved short-lived.2 From the mid-thirteenth century onward, how-
ever, the dominant policies of most of the Italian communes changed toward
strategies of types 1 and 4, pursuing chiefly the interests of the urban mer-
cantile and financial elites alone, but also including the nobles of the contado
who had become included in the effective body politic of the city-state. The
profits of these policies are still visible in the palaces and art treasures left to
posterity by the elites of many Italian cities.
Some of the costs of these policies became visible already in the 12th and
even more the 13th century. A Genoese law of 1159 barred the testimony of
peasants in all lawsuits exceeding 100 soldi. The statutes of Parma in 1255
set the compensation for damage or injury done to a peasant at one-fifth
(20 soldi) of the 100 soldi compensation established for the same damage
done to an urban citizen. At Siena, the Constitution of 1262 set the penalties
for offenses against peasants at one-half of those for the same offenses against
citizens, if the offender also was a peasant; if he was a citizen, the penalties
were further reduced to one-quarter of those for offenses against citizens. At
Bologna, where the peasants had been made legally free in 1256, the Statutes
of 1282 ordained that, in case of disobedience of the peasants against the city,
their villages were to be burned with everything in them, the trees cut down,
and their lands confiscated.3
The subordination of the Italian peasants under the city-states and their
elites became more stringent in most cases during the 14th and 15th centuries.
A parallel development occurred during the same period, in the position of
the urban poor, after the inquisition during the 13th century had already
eliminated many critical and rebellious elements.4 Demands for serious social
change could almost always be made to look like heresy; and although there
were a few later reform movements in some cities, the secular city oligarchies
retained the backing of the Church, and for the mass of the poorer people
the rule was obedience to their ecclesiastic and secular superiors.
The ruthless pursuit of the economic and status interests of the elite of
each city exacted several kinds of long-run costs. Interests can be pursued
ruthlessly only if they are known, or seem to be known, that is, if they are
short-run interests, or if their pursuants have a very arrogant confidence in
their ability to foresee their interests in the long run. Italian city leaders
would betray a rival or an ally as ruthlessly as the Venetians would cut down
a tree in the Italian or Dalmatian mountains. The latter practice led to soil
1
 Cf. L. Salvatorelli, L'ltalia comunale (Milan, Mondadori, 1940), p. 315. W. F. Butler,
The Lombard Communes (New York, Scribners, 1960), pp. 80-91.
2
 Salvatorelli, op. cit., pp. 436-438.
3
 G. Salvemini, "Un comune rurale nel secolo XIII", Studi storici (Firenze, Tipografia
Galileiana, 1901), pp. 20-26; Cf. also Luigi Salvatorelli, op. cit., p. 174.
4
 Cf. Salvatorelli, op. cit., pp. 460-464,
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erosion, the former to the erosion of political trust, both within and between
communities. The ability to make and keep alliances is closely related to the
ability to win, retain and merit trust, to make compromises and to keep them,
to be mindful of the interests of others, and mindful of the uncertainty of
human foresight, of the need for moderation, and of the need to reassure
one's partners they could rely on getting some of the benefits of the doubt
under the uncertain contingencies of the future. All these are habits of mind
and behavior which are acquired and practiced most often in domestic
politics.
By losing these habits of cooperation, compromise and trust at home, the
elites of each Italian city-state also lost them in their dealings with all other
cities. From an early stage most of the Italian cities lost the ability to make
lasting alliances with one another. War between cities — whose rivalry of
territorial expansion compounded their rivalries of trade — became the rule
of North Italian politics; and the chessboard pattern of city alliances, already
described earlier, testified to the prevailing hostility of neighbor against
neighbor.
The most serious long-run cost of this arrangement was the loss of civic
integration. The poor continued to obey, but they ceased to care. They lost
interest in who was to rule their city — which family or faction, which
mercenary leader, or which outside conqueror. This effective withdrawal of
the mass of the people from politics and military matters destroyed the basis
of constitutional government. In domestic affairs, it left each city the prey
of bloody feuds of elite families and factions, ending usually in the tyranny
of some newly emerging prince, or exceptionally in a tight oligarchy of a few
families, as in Venice. Against the outside world, the same popular withdrawal
of support — even more than the disunity of cities and factions deplored by
Machiavelli — eventually made each city and all of Italy defenceless. Between
1494 and 1525, all of Lombardy — and much of the rest of Italy — was
fought over as a piece of booty by foreign armies, many of which numbered
fewer soldiers than there were men capable of bearing arms in the Lombard
cities and villages.5
ANTAGONISTIC COOPERATION: THE STRATEGIES OF THE GERMAN CITIES
Many of the German cities, like many other cities in Northern Europe, had
grown up from settlements of long-distance traders, with no tradition of, or
5
 The French army at Novara in 1512 was estimated at 22,000 men, at Marignano in
1515 at 30,000. The total French force under Francis I in North Italy — "unprece-
dented in Italy" — was reported at 75,000, including numerous garrisons. Nabholz, et
al., Geschichte der Schweiz (Zurich, 1432-38), I, p. 304-307. The population of Lom-
bardy was well in excess of half-a-million, and the number of men capable of bearing
arms — which in Schwyz and Uri amounted to one-quarter of the population — was
in Lombardy alone well above 100,000.
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interest in, territorial government; and eventually most German cities left the
government of the countryside — and thus of more than four-fifths of the
German people — to the rural nobles outside their walls. In contrast to their
counterparts in Italy and Southern France, the German nobles as a rule did
not reside in cities. Most German and Flemish cities made no sustained
efforts to include the rural nobles in their citizenship. Where they did try to
bestow the status of AusbUrger or Pfahlbiirger upon minor rural nobles or
well-to-do peasants, such attempts were generally discouraged by the greater
nobles, by the territorial princes, both clerical and secular, and by the
Emperor himself. Cologne and some other Rhenish cities in the 13th century
concluded treaties which made some rural nobles into "noble citizens" who
did not have to reside in town but were obligated to give military assistance
against pay. "The Rhenish cities do not even think, however, of conducting
a policy of territorial expansion with the aid of these treaties."8 Imperial
prohibitions of, or statements of opposition to, the voluntary or forcible
incorporation of rural nobles as the citizens of cities are on record by
Frederick I in 1182 against the city of Trento, by Frederick II in the 13th
century, by Charles IV in the Golden Bull of 1356, and most revealingly, in
a sworn treaty of 1368 between the Swabian nobles and cities, in which the
cities of Freiburg-im-Breisgau, Breisach and Neuenburg were prohibited from
accepting anyone as AusbUrger in the future — so that here the Swabian
cities themselves become sworn guarantors of the prohibition.7 Freiburg-
im-Breisgau, the first city founded explicitly on the Italian model by the
Zahringer dynasty, in 1120 — as were later Bern and Fribourg — thus did
attempt to carry on an Italian-style policy of the incorporation of nobles and
of territorial expansion, but was stopped by the joint resistance not only of
territorial princes and nobles, but in the end also by that of the other Swabian
cities.
The German Imperial and Hanseatic cities thus followed a mixed strategy
of types 1 and 4. They pursued their trade and craft monopolies against the
countryside, but left the peasants to the rule and exploitation of the nobles;
and these nobles, rather than the peasants, were the chief customers for many
city products and services. Despite the recurrent conflicts between cities and
nobles, the German cities were thus not mainly the opponents of feudalism,
as liberal-democratic and Marxist writers in the 19th and 20th centuries have
pictured them, but rather the elites of these cities were more often themselves
a privileged estate, the tacit collaborationists of aristocratic rule in the
countryside, enemies of rural handicrafts, and co-exploiters of the peasantry.
Pirenne's characterization applies no less to the treatment of the peasants by
• Edith Ennen, Friihgeschichte der europaischen Stadt (Bonn, 1953), p. 256, and gener-
ally pp. 250-257.
7
 Cf. Ennen, op. cit., p. 257; H. Planitz, Die Deutsche Stadt im Mittelalter (Cologne,
1954), p. 274.
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the cities of Flanders and Germany than it does to the latter stages of their
treatment by the city of Florence:
The peasants who dwelt about them did not seem to be compatriots at all. The
one thought was to exploit them profitably. With all their might they stood on
guard to prevent the peasants from freeing themselves from the industrial system
of which the cities had a monopoly. The task of provisioning the cities was like-
wise imposed upon the peasants . . .8
The majority of German cities, however, did not have Imperial status and
the far-reaching self-government — and often virtual sovereignty — which
this implied. Rather they remained under the rule of their ecclesiastic or
secular overlords, or became part of the expanding possessions of some
territorial prince. In these cases, as in Flanders and in much of France, the
city elites followed on the whole strategies of types 5 and 6 — collaboration
with the Church and with the territorial prince — in pursuit of their interests
against the peasantry, the lesser rural nobles, and against the poorer strata
within the urban community itself. Narrowing city oligarchies thus collabo-
rated with growing princely absolutism, from the 14th and 15th centuries
onward, culminating in the increasingly absolutist states of the 16th and
17th centuries — slighting or sacrificing in the pursuit of stable privilege
gradually not only their interests in civic integration but also in external and
even internal self-government.
These developments, to be sure, did not all occur at once. The development
of the German and Flemish cities was characterized at all times also by a
strong element of cooperation, going back, in many cases, to the brotherhoods
or gilds of long-distance traders which had a role in the rise of many of these
cities. Another cooperative element was the gilds of artisans, which played
a larger and longer-lasting role in many German cities than they did in Italy
or Flanders — where their strength was soon undermined by the growing
cleavages between large and small craftsmen and entrepreneurs, between
masters and perpetual journeymen, and eventually between capital and
labor. In the German cities these antagonistic developments were retarded or
moderated, and the institutions, attitudes and social practices of the gilds
and of economic cooperation persisted for a longer time.
Perhaps as a result, there persisted in many German cities also a somewhat
moderate and cooperative style of politics. The typical artisan's gild aimed
at securing a livelihood for all its members; within its ranks, no one was to
8
 Henri Pirenne, Medieval Cities: Their Origins and the Revival of Trade (Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 1946), p. 211, and generally pp. 211-215; cf. also p. 215,
for the indirect pressure on the peasants to produce more, which resulted from these
city policies. For the hostility of the German cities against rural handicrafts, Cf. Liitge,
op. cit., p. 164; for the hostility of Bruges, Ypres and Ghent against smaller cities and
for the destruction of looms outside the city walls by the weavers of Ghent, see J. C.
Gemperle, Belgische und schweizerische Stadteverfassungsgeschichte im Mittelalter
(Louvain, Bibliotheque de l'Universite, 1942), p. 321, with references.
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be eliminated ruthlessly by competition, but some compromise solution was
to be found, acceptable to all members. In such practices as the fixing of
measures and of standards of quality, as well as of prices, and sometimes in
the joint purchase of materials, the craft gilds resembled certain aspects
of modern producers' cooperatives and stressed common interests of their
members which were not necessarily or always directed against a third party.
In relation to other gilds, each gild sought a high price for its products and
a low price for those products of other gilds — such as bread from the
bakers — which its own members had to buy. Since it was obvious, however,
that no gild could dictate to all others — nor get along without their serv-
ices — the manifest facts of economic interdependence once more favored
policies of compromise and mutual cooperation.
A similar style of greater cooperation and readiness to compromise charac-
terized the relations of many German cities toward one another. There are
no cases of long-sustained and devastating hatred between German cities,
such as was notorious between Venice and Genoa, nor was there usually
much readiness on the part of a major city to ally itself with the foreign
enemies of another city, as in the alliance of Bruges with the pro-English and
of Ghent with the pro-French faction in Flanders in 1338-39.9 The German
cities, by contrast, showed remarkable ability to form alliances and to keep
them for a long time. The Rhenish and the Swabian cities, respectively,
formed several such alliances in the 13th and 14th centuries, which culmi-
nated in 1381 in the great alliance of the Rhenish and Swabian Leagues of
Cities, which then was defeated by the South German nobles in 1388. That
defeat ended the independent political role of the South German and Rhenish
cities and opened the way for the rule of territorial princes, just as in the same
decade the defeat at Roosebeke in 1382 had ended the political role of the
cities of Flanders, and opened the way for the later establishment of the
Burgundian state.10 In North Germany, however, the Hanseatic League of
cities reached the peak of its power about 1370 and persisted in strength
until the late 15th century, to peter out in the 17th century, maintaining a
shadow-like existence with Kontors, i.e., offices, in London until 1852 and
Augsburg until 1863."
9
 Gemperle, op. cit., p. 313. The Flemish developments in the 14th century resembled
some of the features of the ruthlessly competitive politics of Northern Italy. The col-
lapse of the autonomy of the Flemish cities and their disastrous defeat at Roosebeke in
1382 have been ascribed to three major factors: the bitter social and industrial conflicts
within the cities, the complete passivity of the rural population, and the resentment of
the lesser towns at their exploitation by the three dominant cities of Ypres, Ghent and
Bruges. Gemperle, op. cit., p. 317.
10
 See preceding note.
11
 For a summary sketch, see Paul Cram, "The Hanseatic League", in W. L. Langer,
Encyclopedia of World History, revised ed. (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1960), pp. 307-
310. Cf. also D. Schafer, Die deutsche Hanse (Leipzig, Velhagen and Klasing, 1903);
Konrad Mass, Die deutsche Hanse (Jena, Diederichs, 1926); Karl Pagel, Die Hanse
(Oldenburg, Stalling, 1942); J. A. Gade, The Hanseatic Control of Norwegian Commerce
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417500003790
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 20:30:37, subject to the Cambridge Core
THE SWISS CITY CANTON 403
The ability to maintain stable alliances in protection of their own autonomy
and interests was one of the most interesting features of the German cities in
general, and of the Hanseatic cities in particular. The very looseness of the
Hanseatic League — its lack of majority rule, or of any common offices of
government over its members, its limitation to specific common economic
interests, and sizable rewards which the common pursuit of these interests
ensured — all these may have contributed to its long survival.
Yet the Hanseatic League was not free from the characteristic limitations
which the pursuit of the mixed strategies of types 1, 4 and eventually 6
entailed. A bare summary tells the tale:
The objectives of the league were mutual security, extortion of trading privileges,
and maintenance of trade monopoly wherever possible... In the 15th century
the league was . . . weakened by the struggle within the member towns between
the democratic guildsmen and the patrician oligarchy. The league threatened the
expulsion of "democratic" towns. The German princes... gradually reduced the
freedom of various powerful members of the league.. .12
The ability of the German cities to maintain alliances, and often also a
measure of civic solidarity, perhaps came from the same cause that was also
the root of their ultimate political weakness. These cities were only partial
states, and they showed no serious intention of becoming full-fledged ones
with their own substantial territories in the manner of the Italian city-states.
They thus could only supplement the feudal and aristocratic social system,
and the princely territorial states into which that system eventually consoli-
dated, but could offer no effective alternatives to these developments.
Many German cities never attained Imperial status but remained under
the role of their bishops or secular overlords, sometimes in fairly complete
dependence but more often with some limited degree of internal self-govern-
ment. Even where such cities strove, however, to enlarge their autonomy —
such as Cologne which temporarily freed itself from the control of its bishop
and became a prominent member of the Hanseatic League — they, too,
eventually fell under internal oligarchy and external dependence, in accord-
ance with the basic limitations of the political strategies which the mass of
German cities had adopted. This was particularly true of the cities of Austria
and the Tyrol, as well as of many Bavarian cities which, in general, pursued
their interests in alliance with, and increasingly in obedience to, the territorial
rulers. Since these rulers also were increasingly backed by the Church, both
Austria and Bavaria became marked strongholds of centralized princely
power.
during the Late Middle Ages (Leiden, Brill, 1951); G. Heitz, ed., Hansische Studien
(Berlin, Akademie-Verlag, 1961).
12
 Paul Cram, in Langer, op. cit., pp. 309-310.
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COLLABORATION WITH THE MONARCH: THE PATTERN OF THE
COMMUNES IN FRANCE AND SAVOY
A similar outcome was reached by a somewhat different pathway by the
communal movement and the cities of France. These cities followed mainly
strategies of the type 6 of our Table. Like the German cities, they left the
countryside and the peasant mass of the French people to the rule of nobles.
In Southern France, some nobles took up residence in towns, but in most of
France, the small nobility remained rural. Like the German cities, the French
cities pursued policies of economic monopoly against the countryside. Within
the cities, the citizens were united by oaths, there was urban self-government,
there were often gilds, and in the early stages there was a measure of civic
solidarity. As in Italy and Flanders, however, there soon developed con-
siderable cleavages between rich and poor. Already in the 13th century, the
trend in most French cities was toward oligarchy and plutocracy, usually in
conjunction with a policy of alliance with the French kings. Such monarchs
as Philip II Augustus (1180-1223), Louis IX (St. Louis, 1226-1270) and
Philip IV (the Fair, 1285-1314) protected the towns against the nobles, and
increasingly the oligarchies within the towns against the lower orders, but
they also drew upon the towns, first as sources of military support — such
as Philip II in the victorious battle of Bouvines against England, Emperor
Otto IV, and most of the feudality of Flanders, Brabant and Lorraine —
and later they drew even more heavily upon the cities, and particularly upon
the communes, as sources of taxation. In 1262 Louis IX introduced an annual
royal audit of communal finances. The cities were powerless to resist the
royal exactions; after 1270 the communal movement declined; the city of
Noyon went bankrupt in 1291; and the inhabitants of a number of cities
petitioned the monarch to abolish their communal form of government which
had become an instrument of local oligarchy and ever-heavier royal taxation.
By the 14th century, the communal era in France was ending — until under
Louis XI in the 15th century the rule of city oligarchies was finally consoli-
dated and the notion of autonomous communes fell into desuetude.13
In Savoy, communal charters of liberties were granted to the larger market
towns by the princes of the dynasty of Savoy or by their major vassals. This
happened later than in France. During the 13th century, twenty towns in
Savoy were granted such charters, beginning with Yenne in 1215; during the
14th century, such grants multiplied. These communal charters obliged each
13
 Cf. Charles Petit-Dutaillis, Les communes frangaises: caractere et Evolution des
origines au XVIII* siecle (Paris, Albin Michel, 1947), pp. 81-83, 102-108, 126, 149,
174-184, 220, 235-244, 363. Cf. also Cram in Langer, op. cit., pp. 229-232. An ex-
ceptional course was taken in the 13th century under English protection by Bordeaux
which acted like a republic in concluding alliances with rural nobles as well as with
the leaders (prud'hommes) of near-by villages. These developments did not lead, how-
ever, to a territorial state. In the course of the 14th century Bordeaux became an
oligarchic city under the rule of the French monarchs. Ibid, pp. 158-161.
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town to furnish taxes and a stated number of men for limited military service;
and they provided for personal freedom of town residents, for trading rights
and privileges, for town assemblies and syndics, and for limited judicial
autonomy, particularly in regard to market regulation. The communes of
Savoy were thus far less political in nature than the French communes had
been in their time of flowering. Their liberties had not been established in
response to the political demands, pressures and struggles of then* citizens,
but rather they had been granted peacefully, most often by Counts of Savoy
who were looking for political and financial counterweights to the power of
their nobles.14 On that innocuous level, many of these charters persisted into
the 18th century, without interfering with the gradual establishment of an
absolutist state.
THE FULL-FLEDGED CITY-STATES OF SWITZERLAND: POLICIES OF
INDEPENDENCE AND ALLIANCE
Many of the details of the history and practices of the major cities that
eventually became Swiss — such as Lucerne, Zurich, Bern, Fribourg, Solo-
thurn, Basel, Schaffhausen, St. Gallen and Geneva — resemble those of the
European cities that we have surveyed. What is different are the sums of
these details — the patterns of policy to which they add up.
By and large, the Swiss cities followed strategies of the types 3 and 2, as
shown in our Table, and they followed strategies of type 1 in pursuit of the
interests of their elites only subject to the extent that this proved compatible
with these overriding strategies. The Swiss cities thus aimed at the status of
full-fledged territorial states on the model of the Italian communes — so
much so that at least one historian has described the formation of the
"Swiss and South German" city-states as extensions of the Italian communal
movement.15 At the same time, however, their internal and external policies
were more cooperative and less competitive, more moderate and inclined to
relatively stable alliances and compromises; and in all these respects they
resembled the traits of German rather than Italian cities. Like the French
communes, they liked to align themselves in the 13th century with distant
monarchs against nearby nobles, but unlike the French towns, they kept and
thereafter steadily increased their fiscal and political autonomy to the point
of practical independence. In this they once again resembled the Italian
communes, and so they did in their steady drive to acquire territories and
14
 Paul Guichonnet, Histoire de Savoie, 2nd ed., pp. 66-67. For many details of the
development of Swiss Cities and States, see Hektor Amman and Karl Schib, Historischer
Atlas der Schweiz (Aaru, Sauerlander, 1951), passim. The many writings of Hektor
Amman should be considered, especially "Das schweizerische Stadtewesen des Mittel-
alters", Extrait des Recueils de la Societe Jean Bodin, Tome VII, 2e partie (Bruxelles,
1956).
15
 Ennen, op. cit., p. 257.
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citizens outside their city walls, and to become virtually complete states.
In all these respects, their political strategies look like mixtures of those
of their neighbors to the North and South. In the most important respects,
however, their strategies were unique. Their attitude towards the peasants on
the whole was one of alliance rather than of exploitation. The peasants of
many rural communities received urban citizenship, as the peasants of the
Hasli Valley, of Saanen, Chateau d'Oex, and other communities of the
Berner Oberland did in Bern. Elsewhere, leading peasants became urban
citizens. Even where peasants became subjects of a Swiss city, their rights
and autonomous institutions ordinarily were confirmed, and their position
tended to improve until the 16th century. Above all, the peasants remained
armed; the cities continued to depend on them for an important part of their
military manpower; and the peasants fought well, side by side with the town
burghers.
In regard to economic policy, the cities did not destroy the rural handi-
crafts, nor did they push their monopolistic or gild interests too far at the
expense of the peasants. "The urban craft gilds never succeeded, except for
luxury trades, to concentrate industrial and craft production monopolistically
in the towns."16 This state of affairs persisted into modern times. Data for
Zurich for 1770 show a proportion of 4.5 per cent craftsmen among the
rural population of the Canton, as against 8 per cent craftsmen in the city
itself.17
Other trade and tax policies toward the peasantry were similarly moderate.
The large houses of the prosperous peasants on Lake Zurich, in the Emmen-
thal, the Berner Oberland and elsewhere were commented upon by astonished
foreign travelers as late as the 17th and 18th centuries. Credit and the need
to repay debts with interest were instruments for the dispossession of minor
nobles rather than of peasants.
As a result of these policies, no large number of dispossessed peasants was
available as a source of cheap wage labor and of any large urban proletariat.
Together with the persistence of rural handicrafts, these conditions retarded
the numerical growth of the Swiss cities. If we consider each city without its
surrounding countryside, Zurich and Bern counted from the 14th through
the 16th century only 6,000 and 5,000 inhabitants, respectively, against
estimated populations of 20,000 for Nurnberg, and over 50,000 for the chief
cities of Flanders and Italy. Only by counting the rural population of each
city canton do we get perhaps 35,000 for Zurich and 80,000 for Bern —
figures that reflect more nearly the effective size and power of these com-
munities.18
18
 Emil Walter, Soziale Grundlagen der Entwicklung der Naturwissenschajten in der
alten Schweiz (Bern, Francke, 1958), p. 34.
17
 Walter, op. cit., p. 35, with references.
18
 Cf. Bickel, Bevolkerungsgeschichte und Bevolkerungspolitik der Schweiz (Zurich,
Gutenberg, 1926), pp. 49, 62-63; Gemperle, op. cit., pp. 256-257, with references.
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In this manner, the elites of the Swiss cities had to sacrifice, or at least
to play down, their potential interests in craft monopolies, and in trade and
tax monopolies against the peasantry, as well as a significant part of their
interests as potential employers or creditors against the rural and urban poor.
By the same token, they could not pursue very far the symbolic expressions
of this range of interests hostile to the peasants and the urban poor. They
could not press effectively their claim to a superior status of all townsmen
against peasants, nor could the rich elevate themselves so far above the poor
within each city as was commonplace in Italy and Flanders.
In exchange for not pressing strongly those of their potential interests that
would have brought them into protracted conflict with the peasants and the
urban poor, the Swiss city elites made considerable gains in regard to other
interests. Their trade routes were always open, and property was safe. An
unprotected man could carry gold in his hand all across Switzerland without
coming to any harm, wrote the chronicler Niklaus Schradin in the 15th
century.19 Though mountains offer potential shelter to robbers, and mountain
populations often have aided them, this was not the case on the Gotthard
route, although there were occasional complaints in the Grisons. Improved
security could also be attained in matters of credit, since each Canton
bound itself to give fair protection through its own judges to the claims of
Confederates.
Thanks to the military backing of their own peasants, and to the alliance
with the Alpine Cantons, the leading burghers of the city Cantons could make
substantial gains in their claims to social equality with the rural nobles.
Although the niceties of etiquette would vary from the 14th to the 16th
century with time and place and power, the difference between the mounting
confidence of the burghers of Swiss cities and the declining prestige of their
counterparts in France, Savoy, and in Germany — including notably Bavaria
and Austria — was conspicuous.
Even more conspicuous were the gains of the Swiss cities in regard to
internal freedom and self-government, to independence, to civic integration,
and to the civic and military participation of a large proportion of their
people. In all these respects, the Swiss cities did much better, and for a far
longer time, than did almost all other cities in Europe.
The choice of interests to be put foremost in the pursuit of policy is in
part also the result of the potential allies and alliances that are available for
their support. Once chosen and maintained for a longer time, however, each
alliance and its outcomes in turn will strengthen or weaken the original
interests for which it was invoked, and thus remake — reinforce or modify —
the earlier interest configuration that gave it birth. In the case of the Swiss
cities, their most important potential allies turned out to be the Alpine Cantons.
Nowhere else in Europe were there such unusual peasants with such skills
19
 Wolfgang von Wartburg, Geschichte der Schweiz, p. 79.
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and experiences in transport, trade, monetary and military matters, with such
effective political organizations, and located astride such crucial trade routes
and passes.
Once they had been picked for allies, however, the presence of these
irreversibly self-governing Alpine peasants and their communities inevitably
influenced the political and social climate in the rural environment of such
cities as Lucerne and Zug, Zurich and Bern, and eventually all the way
to Fribourg, Basel, Schaffhausen and St. Gallen. Even within the cities
themselves, wherever there were elements pressing for a more democratic
communal order, the example and the potential support of the Alpine com-
munities had its effect. Moreover, once a city had allied itself with the Alpine
Cantons, these were apt to treat the alliance as "eternal" and in effect
indissoluble; they would fight against any city that would later try to break
away, and thus indirectly strengthen those elements within each city that
would make the alliance permanent.
There is no room here to put these findings in the wider context of Swiss
history and social evolution. One point, however, may be indicated here.
Medieval Switzerland was not a country defined by nature or long-established
history, within whose fixed borders certain policies, strategies, institutions,
habit patterns and social and political culture were then adopted. Rather,
certain political strategies were chosen, opportunities taken and mutual com-
mitments made; and the collection of the rural and urban communities where
such mutually compatible strategies were chosen and where such commitments
became stabilized then came to form the confederation and finally the country
that is now known as Switzerland. The particular institution of the Swiss city
Canton — like that of the Swiss rural Canton — was made by the invention
and adoption of particular strategies and the particular social order to which
these strategies led; and the persistence and consolidation of these cantons
then gradually made the people that calls itself "Confederates" and the nation
we call Swiss.
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